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Abstract 
This paper presents the case for IT transformation and big data for safety risk 
management on the GB railways. This paper explains why the interest in data driven 
safety solutions is very high in the railways by describing the drivers that shape risk 
management for the railways. A brief overview of research projects in the Big Data Risk 
Analysis (BDRA) programme supports the case and helps understand the research agenda 
for the transformation of safety and risk on the GB railways. The drivers and the projects 
provide insight in the current research needs for the transformation and explains why 
safety researchers have to broaden their skill set to include digital skills and potentially 
even programming. The case for IT transformation of risk management systems is 
compelling and the paper describes just the tip of the iceberg of opportunities opening up 
for safety analysis that, after all, depends on data. 
 
Introduction 
Computer scientists are clear in their belief that the data revolution is coming of age: 
there is a firm belief that the enormous amounts of data collected will inevitably lead to a 
revolution in how management will be undertaken in the future [1, 2, 3]. Yet, to date, the 
potential benefit of this revolution has barely been investigated for safety and risk 
management.  
The term big data has been created to describe the methods and techniques that process 
and extract meaning from very large amounts of data; despite being very widely used 
there is no common definition of the term [4,5,6]. The broad interpretation is that big data 
systems economically extract value from huge volumes of a variety of data sources very 
quickly (leading to the Three Vs definition of big data: volume, variety, and velocity). A 
sceptical view is that this definition we can imagine that big data is simply another fad to 
describe a step forward in the evolution of management decision-support tools or 
Business Intelligence systems. In this work, however, we take a more optimistic view 
where big data creates opportunities for intelligent systems. In fact, the design of purpose 
built IT systems is not the principal concern in this paper, it is the development of a form 
of machine-assisted interpretation (perhaps resembling intelligence) in the form of a 
software layer that bridges the gap between data sources and the theoretical and practical 
mechanisms to deliver safety on the railways. This bypasses the need to specify what the 
 3 
data should look like to support the safety system precisely and perfectly. Instead the 
extraction of safety relevant information and safety lessons is guided by theoretical and 
practical safety principles applied on existing data. Data that was not necessarily 
purposefully designed for safety analysis or safety systems. With this approach data 
drives safety rather than the other way around. This creates opportunities in the 
development of new safety solutions but it comes at a cost that some safety issues are 
difficult to capture with existing data streams or data may simply be absent.  
This paper describes the approach that shapes risk management for the GB railways that 
inexorably leads to data-driven intelligent safety solutions and thereby explains the 
heightened interest in data-driven safety solutions. The drivers are explained by re-
iterating common principles for managing railway safety and setting them against the 
greater global trends in IT and big data on the railways.  
 
Drivers for IT transformation and BDRA 
Common principles for railway safety 
System safety management is the application of technical and managerial techniques to 
the systematic, forward-looking identification and control of hazards throughout the life-
cycle of a project or activity. It calls for structured and rigorous identification and 
analysis of hazards; as well as the establishment of processes for change management, 
decision-making, implementation of risk controls, and on-going monitoring of safety. 
Principle 1: Serious accidents are not tolerated 
The prevention of serious accidents is a key focus of all railway partners. Accidents 
involving trains are disruptive, costly and cause human suffering; all of which damage 
the rail industry as a whole. Extensive media coverage on train accidents inevitably 
shapes public opinion regarding railway safety: in general the public abhors rail accidents 
but tends to be unwilling to fund safety investment (through fare or tax increases) or 
tolerate operational restrictions (such as speed restrictions). In very broad terms, public 
abhorrence influences the design of legislation requirements and the level of operational 
safety performance. The codification of public opinion and trade-off between law, safety 
performance and operational performance is unique to each country in the world and may 
vary widely from one country to another. In UK ‘societal concern’ is outside of the scope 
of legal responsibility for safety. Nevertheless, official bodies, such as the Office of Rail 
and Road and the Railway Accident Investigation Board have some degree of freedom 
when it comes to focussing attention to inspection and prosecution within the framework 
of legislative requirements. 
 Principle 2: Railway engineering for safety is of high integrity 
Through continuous and determined effort to improve safety, a very high standard has 
been set for the safety integrity of railway engineering; but this integrity comes at a high 
price, both in terms of the direct cost of equipment, but also the cost of safety 
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management systems to operate the railway. A challenge for any railway is to reduce 
these costs whilst still operating a safety and efficient railway. This challenge is often met 
with the application of advanced technological systems such as the ones described in this 
paper. 
Principle 3: The railways must not become less safe than they currently are 
The closer that rail safety moves towards absolute safety, the more difficult it becomes to 
achieve further improvements, or even maintain the status quo. Continuous development 
is constrained by increasing costs, technological limitations, and the fundamental need to 
keep railway traffic moving to support the economy at large. One way to keep ahead in 
this challenge is to employ research in safety and reliability management. The GB 
railways have consistently been the safest in Europe which makes it especially prone to a 
reversal of the safety record and drives it to the edge of technology for even better safety 
performance.  
IT trends for railway safety 
In many ways, the extensive use of data systems in business is not a novelty. However, 
with increasing maturity of business intelligence systems, comprehensive digitized safety 
management systems are becoming more common.  
Trend 1: The global digitalization trend 
The global effort for IT transformation of business is hard to capture in a few words. It is 
served by a huge academic society and a massive industry. Areas of attention include: 
hardware development; algorithms to improve data storage and access; algorithms to 
reduce processing time; novel concepts for high-performance computing; and elaborate 
enterprise software techniques. The added value of these areas is that IT systems become 
better at supporting businesses [1, 7, 8, 9]. Academic domains for creating solutions 
include research in software systems [e.g. 10], ontologies [11], artificial intelligence [12], 
and business process modelling [13]. Big data is a label for the global digitalization trend 
that powers global business change and drives the digitalization of railways and railway 
safety. The label may change over time, but the global effort for the development of 
digital systems does not.  
These developments are entering the GB railways and offer substantial advantages to the 
industry as a whole. The TSLG [14] report addresses the ambitions of the GB railways to 
embark on this journey of technological advancement in IT. 
Trend 2: Datafication of railways  
Big data project are appearing in the railways. [15, 16, 17, 18]. A particular area of 
interest is asset management with RFID systems [19, 20, 21, 22]. Although the work 
contain some references to safe operation, the do not deal with safety or risk 
management. Another data-hungry domain is condition monitoring: detectors attached to 
trains and rails are collecting and analysing huge amounts of data that would have been 
unmanageable until relatively recent advances in technology [23, 24]. 
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European research projects such as “Intelligent integration of railway systems” 
(INTEGRAIL) and “Automated and cost effective railway infrastructure maintenance” 
(ACEM-rail) pave the way for the datafication of the railways [25, 26]. The direction that 
these projects take are further supported by underlying work that provides the data 
modelling tools required to manage big data projects for infrastructure such as the 
RailML framework that was developed by the UIC [27]. The railways embrace the digital 
transformation as an opportunity for improvement. Investigations into driverless trains, 
remote condition monitoring, digital ticketing and intermodal data interchange to support 
freight transport between ports and the railways are performed by railway organizations 
around the world. European infrastructure managers are making data-live feeds available 
to support this effort [28, 29, 30, 31].  
Within the GB railways big data activities are underway, such as the ORBIS project in 
Network Rail [32] and rail condition monitoring [24]. 
Trend 3: Increased use of data driven safety risk controls 
The traditional methods of safety risk management include well-tested techniques such as 
HAZOP, FMECA and fault tree analysis. Traditionally, individual risk models are fed by 
dedicated databases that provide cleansed data in a dedicated format for use in the risk 
model. These databases can be very large; for example, the SMIS database that is used to 
populate the Safety Risk Model for the GB railways contains more than two million 
records. Such databases are required to support risk-based decision making based on 
evidence.  
 
But it is not just risk management systems that are evidence based. RAMS analyses form 
the backbone for the approval of technical systems on the railway (viz. EN50126, 
EN50128 & EN50129). When it comes to the implementation of advanced engineering 
systems, advanced tools help deal with the complexity of technical systems and safety-
critical software systems but tend to be data-intensive. Examples include: Hip-Hops [33]; 
advanced safety case management [34]; software verification [35, 36, 37]. This 
development has inspired the development of advanced computer languages to represent 
risk scenarios [38]. Railway traffic management is a particularly challenging area and 
today’s signalling systems are based on fully integrated technical systems hosted by data-
centres.  
 
In the UK, the digital railway programme paces the digital transformation forward using 
ERMTS as a driver for the digital transformation of the railways [39, 40].  
Trend 4: IT supported safety management systems 
The Safety Risk Model [41,42] estimates risk from the full range of ‘hazardous events’ 
that might arise on the GB railways by estimating the frequency of these events, the 
likelihood of their various potential consequences and the severity of these consequences. 
Train accidents, and other high severity, low frequency events are estimated using 
detailed fault tree and event tree models, which were developed to provide a structured 
representation of the cause and consequences of potential accidents arising from the 
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operation and maintenance of the railway. The model is fed with data from the Safety 
Management Information System that contains more than two million data points. The 
SRM is supported by individual risk models that have been developed by RSSB and other 
railway companies in the UK for specific railway risks such as the Signal Overrun Risk 
Assessment Tool (SORAT) which analyses collision risk related to signalling layout 
design, and the All Level Crossing Risk Model, which looks at the risk from level 
crossings. It is the continued improvement of the SRM and other risk models that steers 
toward big data safety management systems. Thereby changing from IT supported 
systems to systems where IT provides interpretation and intelligence.  
Trend 5: Big Data for safety science 
An example of a big data safety system is the GeoSRM risk model to deal with localized 
risks [43]. The pilot model is based on the Safety Risk Model, but the fundamental 
difference between the two models is that the GeoSRM shows, on a map, how risk is 
distributed across the network, rather than generating a single national estimate for each 
type of event. A particular issue arose in the preparation of data: huge amounts of data 
were needed to populate the localised models, including not just safety incident data, but 
also timetable data and asset information. The GeoSRM pilot model has been proven 
with a subset of data dealing with risk profiles for derailment, suicides, and station slips, 
trips and falls for the ‘Wessex’ route in the South West of England.  
Remember that we make a distinction between IT systems and data analytics in the sense 
that the latter depends on machine-assisted interpretation. The difference being that we 
do not specify what the data ought to look like for the purpose of safety management but 
we take the data as it is and construct interpretation algorithms to extract safety learning 
from it. A paper published in 2015 cautiously approaches the problem by focussing on 
the dangers of using big data and the potential security risks and risk associated with loss 
of data and limitations to interpretation of data [44] but a paper from that same year 
describes an analytic system to analyse human reliability [45]. The latter describes a 
computer based text interpretation engine to extract factors pertaining to training in 
nuclear power plants; an engine to populate a Bayesian belief net that is changed based 
on the findings of the interpretation and subsequently calculates the network to assess 
training quality on the nuclear site. A paper from the construction of a metro system in 
Wuhan describes how visual recordings and text-based commentaries are combined to 
detect and monitor unsafe behaviour [46]. An investigation in the UK extracted evidence 
from train data recorders to analyse the mental and physical demand on drives whilst they 
are driving trains [47]. Those researchers also created automated interpretation 
algorithms to extract safety relevant intelligence from a data-source that was not designed 
for that use. The final paper that relates big data and risk does not treat a safety solution 
but elaborates on developments for risk in relation to asset reliability and industrial 
systems reliability [48]. Though reliability is outside the scope of this paper, the overview 
provides three clear visions for risk research in the near future: technological advances in 
business intelligence (combining analysis methods and improve mining methods); system 
security and reliability (pertaining on the risks to the IT system itself); and advances in 
operational risk management, including the development of operational risk management 
frameworks.  
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Several safety software suppliers have embraced software solutions to deal with large 
data streams and harnessing potential for big data analytics. These solutions tend to use 
Bowties as their centre piece. In 2016, a paper by DNV describes the concepts for 
dynamic barrier management with an explicit reference to linking databases containing 
audits, barrier sensor data, control system data, incident data, maintenance records and 
personnel data to barrier monitoring systems [49]. Especially sensor data and control 
system data, which is not purposefully built for the safety control system, machine 
interpretation of mixed data sources is used. In 2016, CGE launched a cloud-based 
Bowtie solution to enable the big-data approach [50]. These developments have mostly 
come from the developments in the field of dynamic barrier management, an area that has 
received attention for a long time and also started incorporating machine interpretation 
e.g. [51].  
 
The case for IT transformation of safety management 
The case for IT transformation of safety management on the GB railways is made by the 
combination of the constant strive for safer railways and the relentless ingress of IT 
solutions in the railways and railway safety management. It is sensible to consider a 
systems approach to the IT transformation for safety management systems rather than 
working from individual technological solutions.  
Safety activities must be integrated with all parts of the railway system for it to be 
effective and efficient [52]. A large part of the safety activities is delivered through safety 
management systems that aim to be holistic. This makes safety management an inclusive 
business process that, in principle, can be transformed into a big data business process.  
This part of the paper demonstrated that the choice for investigating whether big data 
solutions that incorporate machine interpretation could benefit safety and risk for the 
railways in Britain. The arrival of big data management techniques for the railways 
provides a signpost to where risk management techniques may develop in the future. Yet 
the shape of things to come is unclear which leads to core research question for the 
BDRA research programme: how can big data techniques, exploiting machine 
interpretation of huge data sets be used most effectively to transform safety management 
systems for railway safety? The next part treats some projects in the BDRA research 
programme which shed some light into answering this question.  
Introducing machine-assisted interpretation and intelligence: BDRA 
The Big Data Risk Analysis (BDRA) research programme is a joint effort by RSSB and 
the Institute of Railway Research at the University of Huddersfield that investigates the 
potential for machine interpretation techniques for Safety. The objective is to investigate 
to what extent big data techniques, with a particular emphasis on machine-assisted 
interpretation, can support the current Safety Risk Model of RSSB and to investigate 
whether the modern data-analytics methods will change traditional risk analysis methods, 
and if so, how. The overview in the next two sections helps understand which alleys are 
investigated for the transformation of safety and risk on the GB railways. Six projects 
that are discussed, they were set up as relatively independent projects to investigate 
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different aspects of BDRA. Due to their differences, these projects provide a broad 
overview of the usefulness of big data to railway safety. For most of the projects, 
progress has been described in other papers so only a summary is repeated here. The 
projects discussed here are the following: OTDR based SPAD-Safety Indicator, RAATS, 
Learning from text-based Close Call records, visual analytics, ontology and SMIS+. The 
first project will be treated in more detail because it is not described elsewhere and it 
provides insight in skills that future safety analysts will have to embrace to perform 
safety data analyses.  
 
A BDRA project: Leading SPAD safety indicator from OTDR 
SPAD risks 
A SPAD, a Signal Passed At Danger constitutes a serious breach of safety. When a signal 
is at danger, showing a red aspect, a train does not have the authority to proceed because 
the line is occupied. To some extent, it is similar to a red light in a road; it immediately 
puts the vehicle at risk from colliding into another one. In GB railway signalling, 
however, the driver has warning systems at their disposal. For the route considered in this 
work the warning signals work as follows. If the line ahead is clear, a signal shows a 
green aspect, indicating that it is safe to proceed. A double yellow indicates that the next 
signal is showing a yellow signal but the train may proceed as normal. A single yellow 
indicates that the driver has to prepare to stop at the next signal that could be red. A red 
signal indicates that stopping is obligatory. The driver is supported by a signalling system 
that is relevant for this discussion: AWS. An AWS horn is triggered with a magnet on the 
rails (typically at about 180 meters before the signal, depending on the line speed) that 
indicates that the next signal is a restrictive aspect (not green). The driver has 2.4 seconds 
to acknowledge the horn by pushing a button, if the button is not pressed, the train will 
brake automatically, thereby supporting the driver in preventing a SPAD.  
OTDR data 
On train data recorders (OTDR) are used to collect data from trains, to assess how they 
are driven and the state of various train systems during its journey. Examples of data 
collected include power and brake controller position, driver acknowledgement of 
signalling system warnings, whether the doors are open, the operation of driver's 
reminder appliance and the emergency bypass switch systems and the operation of the 
brake system. 
OTDR data are also used in: 
 Incident/accident investigation, 
 Automated train condition monitoring, for example, TAPAS condition monitoring 
system processes data recorded by OTDR to identify the required maintenance for 
trains [53], 
 9 
 Automated driver assessment, for example, TAPAS and Churros process OTDR 
data to estimate a number of speed indictors such as the speed at which power 
Notch 4 is selected when accelerating. 
This project extends the use of OTDR data to leading indicators for SPAD risk.  
Method: data cleansing 
OTDR raw data from a single class of trains is received in their native or ‘raw’ data 
format. This format is optimized for compactness and has to be reformatted before it can 
be analysed. The initial handling examines types and format of data channels (that appear 
in rows) and corrects them if needed. The two corrections are correcting notation of time 
and filling out missing data. The latter is helpful in the analysis as some channels only 
record changes of state (and don’t record any data whilst the state remains the same) and 
some channels do not record zeroes. The changes have been manually checked against a 
manual extraction process using Excel. To automate the correction of data format, an R 
script illustrated by figure 1 has been written. Stage 1 simply turns the raw data into a 
CSV file format. The second stage converts relative journey into seconds: “+ 
01h24mn26s6” to “5066.6” seconds. Stage 3 corrects for slightly differing times from 
different data channels. This is required because a relative journey time record appears 
more than once with different groups of variables (i.e. for the same time record, there are 
more than one input line from different data channels). A process was carried out to 
compress all variables occurred at the same time in a single data row. In Stage 4, all the 
missing data were filled using different logical processes, for example;  
 Merging speed information from two different columns of the data source into a 
single column; 
 Filling the missing values of train distance with calculated distance based on the 
available time duration and train speed.  
This particular error checking is specific to train class used in this study. Other classes 
that use other data systems to record OTDR will need similar error handling and 
cleansing routines to make it useable.  
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Figure 1. data cleaning and processing. 
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Method: approaching a red aspect 
The train speed when the driver receives the last AWS horn prior to a red signal is 
considered a leading indicator for SPADs. A high speed when approaching a red signal 
may cause a SPAD or lead to a full brake application to stop the train at the correct 
location, about 20 metres away from the red signal. An algorithm was developed to read 
the train speeds when the driver receives the last AWS horn before a red signal. The 
algorithm differentiates between trains stopping at a station or a red signal by checking 
door release as illustrated in figure 2. When the train stops without a subsequent door 
release (so, when the train is approaching a signal outside a train station), the AWS horn 
event is identified from the AWS channels measurements. If there are a number of AWS 
horns during the period under investigation the time of last horn is extracted along with 
the train speed. The procedure was not optimized for computational speed; this is a 
subject of further work.  
 12 
 
Figure 2. Speed at last AWS horn. 
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Results and discussion 
A number of routes were investigated and the variation in the train speed at receiving the 
AWS last horn. Table 1 shows an excerpt of this data. The table shows the presents a 
number of services, how many red aspects it approached during that service and the 
maximum speed at AWS horn recorded for any red aspect approached at the red aspect. 
For one of the approaches, the speed is higher than the recommended 20 mph but only by 
a small margin. Further analysis showed that this train could come to a standstill at the 
red signal with the lowest braking step if it were immediately activated.  
 
Journey Number  Number of red 
Signals 
Maximum train Speed approaching 
a red aspect 
1  1 16 
2  0 NA 
3  2 20 
4  2 11 
5  1 14 
6  4 15 
7  1 11 
8 1 14 
9 1 11 
10 2 22 
11 2 13 
12 1 14 
Table 1. Maximum speed at AWS horn prior to red aspect on a single route. 
 
Though the results of this analysis do not seem very spectacular it has important 
consequences for the GB railways, especially when the analysis is scaled-up to include all 
trains in GB in which case it provides a national leading indicator for SPAD risks. When 
the indicator keeps rising on a national level, it is worth investigating the cause of the 
national rise. The number is potentially also useful for smaller parts of the GB railways: 
operating companies can compare their safety performance, high-risk routes can be 
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identified and particularly troublesome signal locations can be redesigned. Railway 
partners in GB now have to consider the desired use of this, and other digital safety 
solutions going forward in the future.  
Also, the seemingly straightforward result hides the fact that the development of safety-
inspired data systems is not a straightforward task at all. Data from different sources, 
recording different channels and storing them in different ways have to be harmonized, 
technical flaws have to be corrected (such as different times recorded in different data-
channels) and harmonized, and the system has to be scaled-up to a national digital 
system. In theory digital interoperability language, such as RailML [27], can be used for 
that but it is technically challenging and requires constant review by safety experts to 
ensure that the desired safety outcome is met. This means that safety experts have to 
upgrade their skill set with knowledge about digital systems and, preferably, 
programming if they are to assess modern safety solutions.  
 
Succinct description of published BDRA projects 
Red aspect approach to signals (RAATS) 
In the RAATS project, SPAD risks are assessed by identifying how many times trains 
approach a signal when it is displaying a red aspect [54]. Traditionally, this frequency is 
estimated from counting samples on trains. This project increases the sample set to all 
connected signalling systems, which covers about 70% of the GB railway network. 
The source of the information used in the RAATS software is Train Describer (TD) data 
[56]. A Train Describer is an electronic device connected to each signalling panel which 
provides a description of each train (its ‘headcode’) and which section of track (or ‘track 
section’) it currently occupies. RAATS software reads the TD live-feed, stores it in a 
database, calculates which trains actually approach a red aspect and presents the data in a 
graphical interface or creates an excel file for further analysis. The approaches to signals 
for a single signal can be analysed over a period from a single day to a period of a year. 
Alternatively the user can choose to analyse all signals in a TD-area or indeed all the 
signals in the database. 
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Figure 3. RAATS GUI showing signal ET776. 
 
Figure 1 shows the RAATS user interface. The pie chart shows the results for a single 
signal: ET776 which is located on the up Cowdenbeath line at Redford. The figure shows 
that at 23%, of trains approach the signal at red in the period of the 17th of August 2014 
to the 13th of October 2014 which is a high percentage compared with the average. The 
bar chart shows the signals with the highest train approach frequencies (top ten) in the 
EA signalling area in Edinburgh (bottom left: Select TD). The names of the signals are 
not visible in this figure. 
In this way, RAATS software provides intricate details about the number of trains 
approaching a signal at danger and helps identify high-risk signals. This information can 
be used in subsequent risk analyses for signals.  
The full scientific description is given by Zhao [54]. 
 
Safety learning from Close Calls 
A close call is a hazardous situation where the event sequence could lead to an accident if 
it had not been interrupted by a planned intervention or by random event [56]. Network 
Rail workers and specific sub-contractors within the GB railway industry are asked to 
report such events in the ‘Close Call’ database. Close Call reports are freeform text 
reports where anyone can enter a situation that, in their view, could have led to an 
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accident. This leaves the reporter with more freedom to report what they think are 
dangerous situations and could, in theory, lead to a richer data-source for railway safety 
issues. The Close Call Database collects approximately 150,000 entries annually. Due to 
the large number of records, it is impractical to manually review the records and therefore 
computer-based techniques have been developed to extract safety relevant information 
from them. 
Since the key safety information is embedded in text, Natural Language Processing or 
NLP is used. NLP techniques have been an emerging area of study over the past two 
decades [57, 58, 59, 60]. One of the key problems is the inherent ambiguity in written 
language. These include jargon, abbreviations, misspelling and lack of punctuation. 
Processing of Close Call data by extracting information from free text involves five 
processes: 
• Text cleansing, tokenizing, and tagging; 
• Ontology parsing and coding (creation of a taxonomy of related words); 
• Clustering (creation of groups of records that are semantically similar); 
• Text analysis and; 
• Information extraction. 
As this process description suggests, a sensible automated text analysis is complicated. 
The exact procedure is elsewhere [60]. This paper highlights two investigations for the 
information extraction process. 
The first investigation is the identification of incidents with track workers. The SMIS 
database (GB reportable incident database for railways) shows that incidents with track 
workers take place most frequently in the hours between 11:00 and 15:00. The analysis 
was performed to investigate whether the same pattern is present in the Close Call 
database. An automated search query was programmed to retrieve the 
protection/possession arrangements events in the Close Call database as function of time-
of-day. The results are compared SMIS data. The relative distributions of these events by 
time of day are shown in figure 4. The figure illustrates that the SMIS incident database 
and Close Call reports follow similar trends during the day. Unfortunately, the times at 
which reports are made trend for all close calls are similar to the times reports are made 
for protection arrangements, which suggests that reporting bias may interfere. 
The high fraction of Close Call events between 00:00 and 01:00 is due to a default of the 
reporting system that sets the time-stamp to 00:00 when the time of the incident is not 
entered by the person making the entry. This correction is made more frequently with the 
Close Call database than the SMIS database since there is less rigorous quality control on 
Close Call reports. 
The second investigation is a similar problem but now focussed on trespass. The question 
was whether trespasses take place at certain times of the day or equal probability 
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throughout the day? Figure 5 shows the frequency of occurrence for trespass based on 
automated identification of trespass events in the Close Call database. Note that trespass 
does not occur with equal frequency throughout the day. The trend seems that they occur 
more frequently during working hours. What causes this trend is as yet unexplained but 
similar to the possession entries, reporting bias may play a role. 
 
Figure 4. Frequencies of workforce incidents in SMIS and Close Call. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Frequency of trespass as function of time-of-day. 
The journal paper describing this project in detail is published elsewhere [61]. 
 
Visual analytics 
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Visual analytics (VA) enhances the analysis and discovery of information from data; it 
engages creative interpretations in humans beyond those that a computer can detect 
automatically [62]. VA enables interactive learning with computers, which makes it 
quick and efficient and potentially enables better decisions [63, 64, 65].  
The investigation featured here analyses a data set of 500 records that were a random 
sample of 12,171 Slip, Trip & Fall Close Call records. The text was pre-processed to 
eliminate anomalies that could obscure the text analysis. For instance, essential multi-
words that represent one concept are detected to used to create a unique tokens (e.g. 
TRIPPING_HAZARD_ and NETWORK_RAIL_) and information of places, codes, 
numbers or measured entities are condensed into tags (e.g. GEO_PLACE and _CODE_). 
The cleansed text was transformed into a network building its word-per-word co-
occurrence matrix. The nodes of the matrix are words of the text, tokens or tags. This 
matrix maps the nodes of a network into pairs of nodes and it is a common input for 
visualisation tools. Figure 6 shows part of the word-network that was created; it identifies 
missing covers and trough lids as causes for slip-trip and fall incidents. The journal paper 
describing this project in detail is published elsewhere [66]. 
 
 
Figure 6: Visual analytics for risk identification 
Ontologies 
Railways have primarily used ontologies for describing railways systems in order to 
support traceability of information in data integration processes and design engineering 
processes [67, 68, 69, 70, 71]. The combination of information from different railway 
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data sources can provide valuable insights about the railway system and its engineering 
processes; however it requires a complete and structured data in order to analyze them. 
For instance, in the TD feed, a piece of track is referred to as a block number but in Close 
Call, a distance from a station indicates that same piece of track. So it is necessary to 
define a common vocabulary between the systems or knowledge domains that allows the 
communication between them. Ontologies are key enablers for the exchange of 
information in data-fusion since they help to maintain the context (semantics) when 
information is used in conjunction. Moreover, ontologies can be shared by railway 
operators that are in competition, helping to distinguish between shared information (such 
as accident reports) and intellectual property that should not be shared This work was not 
published in a journal but in a technical report [72]. 
The RAATS project uses a hard coded ontology to extract relevant information from the 
live stream TD feed. Concepts that it uses for extracting the right information include: 
train head codes (e.g. 1F98), timestamps (unix timestamp, e.g. 1458649435), TD areas 
(e.g. MP), signal ID’s (e.g. MP1201) and Berth ID’s (e.g. 1201). Concepts that it uses for 
analysis include: GRN (not a Red Aspect Approach incident), CSS (Cleared Stopped at 
signal), CAS (Cleared Approaching at Signal) and CNV (Cleared Not Visible) to 
describe the various types of red aspect approaches. The dissemination ontology includes: 
time windows; geographical areas; input concepts and analysis concepts. The ontology is 
a lightweight ontology with high specificity and direct application in a software system. 
Figure 7 shows the input ontology alongside a single data entry (derived from Zhao, 
2016). 
 
Figure 7. Input taxonomy for RAATS, example data in brackets. 
 
SMIS+ 
Alongside the BDRA research programme, RSSB is in the process of completely 
modernising the Safety Risk Model and the tools around it to revolutionise safety risk 
management and decision support. The SMIS+ programme is underway which provides 
an opportunity to systematically capture the data that is required to perform localised 
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analyses, in a format that can be readily used to support risk modelling and analysis. The 
programme upgrades SMIS and creates a new cloud-based on-line system exploiting 
commercial off-the-shelf, state of the art, enterprise safety management software. The 
system has been specified taking into account the data needs of the safety risk model and 
the GeoSRM, as well as through consideration of a huge number of Railway specific 
‘bow-tie’ models developed by RSSB, following significant work on bow-ties across the 
Rail Industry in Great Britain. The system incorporates the collection of information 
around the safety incidents currently reported into SMIS, but will also capture data 
relating to Close Calls as representatives for precursor incidents or breaches in safety 
management controls. The SMIS+ programme will offer industry a more intuitive and 
powerful tool to report and track all safety-related incidents in a new common format. 
The SMIS+ platform offers a platform for the development of advanced business 
intelligence (BI) features will also allow stakeholders to create their own local safety 
performance dashboards. A more detailed description is given elsewhere [73]. 
 
Challenges and research issues 
This part of the paper focussed on brief descriptions of research projects in the BDRA 
programme. The projects demonstrate potential of the big data techniques for the safety 
and risk sciences this paragraph highlights challenges and research issues.  
Invariably, more data enables a richer risk analysis. More data holds the promise of better 
evidence to support safety and risk analyses which, when processed adequately, informs 
decision-making and prognostics. However, extracting the right information is not 
straightforward. On an operational research level the challenges are mostly related to a 
skills gap. To be able to implement big data techniques, safety researchers need to 
understand data and databases. For example, RAATs has to deal with almost 800,000,000 
messages per year. Parts of the data are corrupted parts of the data are conflicting and 
parts are simply absent. Safety scientists need to learn to work with a variety of huge 
databases that invariably contain imperfections. We found that extracting data could not 
simply be delegated to programmers; researchers need to understand databases to work 
with them or to instruct them effectively. In a similar way, safety scientists need to 
understand data visualization, analytics software, natural language processing and 
ontologies. Put it another way, safety scientists have to become proficient with basic 
computer science, IT systems and especially databases. 
A richer data-environment is essential for a number of concepts in Safety Science. First, 
there is the concept that more information from near misses could strengthen the 
evidence base for risk analyses (which may be viewed as the contested ‘iceberg’ theory 
that saw its first iteration with Heinrich’s triangle). The Close Call database was set up 
for that purpose. With 150,000 text records per year and automated natural language 
interpretation its scientific foundations can be investigated more rigorously than before. 
Interestingly, the Safety II approach also depends on integrating more data, even if that is 
on successes rather than failures. From the data-analytics approach, however, the 
problems are similar: a justified and effective integration of different data sources is 
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required. Providing the rationale and justification for integration the integration of 
imperfect data sources is a scientific challenge for safety research in the near future. 
Another area where efficient integration of databases is required is dynamic barrier 
management; it depends on online systems that gather data from different databases that 
could be physically distributed over the world. Integration of such data depends on 
sensible risk ontologies and clear visualization (e.g. in a bow-tie). Though the concept is 
relatively straightforward, its technical development is challenging even with modern 
Enterprise IT systems. Safety scientists will have to develop knowledge management 
systems based on ontologies that define and map out the relationship between concepts in 
safety and translate them into machine-readable systems. 
Safety Scientists will be confronted with new methods and solutions and will have to 
assess their scientific validity for the safety sciences. The word cloud in figure 6 is an 
example of a new method: a well established clustering technique now contains words 
that have meaning for safety and risk analysts. Safety scientists will have to contemplate 
whether such techniques are valid for use in safety management systems and if so, under 
what conditions they are acceptable. This is just one example but computer scientists 
continue to develop tools and solutions that safety scientists will have to consider at some 
point in the near future.  
Finally, safety scientists will be confronted with Artificial Intelligence solutions in the 
near future. AI presents a special problem for safety solutions in the sense that it is a 
black-box approach: users do not know what goes on inside. This creates an issue with 
trust: can we trust AI to make safety-critical decisions on a management level? And if AI 
made a decision that turned out to cost lives, who is liable? One way of dealing with AI is 
to assess its performance against benchmark systems but which systems would be 
sufficiently reliable to do that? 
 
Conclusion 
This paper presents the case for opening our minds to big data analytics, machine-assisted 
interpretation and business intelligence in safety management. It describes the drivers that 
shape the research, initial experiences with data systems for safety and sheds light on 
challenges and scientific issues. The case is compelling and worthy of our attention but it 
also shows that safety analysts have to adjust their skill set to be future-proof. In that 
sense, this work contributes to the way forward in the integration of computer science 
and the safety sciences.  
What remains is to define what BDRA systems actually are. We suggest the following: 
BDRA systems are IT solution systems that: 
 extract information from data with high volume, variety and velocity to 
 interpret the data quickly with a collection of software applications to 
 extract relevant safety and risk intelligence to populate 
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 online interfaces to connect the right people at the right time in order to 
 provide decision support for safety and risk management. 
The process of redesigning traditional safety management systems or their digitized 
counterparts we shall call Safety Management System Transformation or SMS 
Transformation. The design of software solutions for SMS Transformations we shall call 
Safety Enterprise Architecture.  
We suggest that research focuses on three key areas: design and specification of safety 
data models and safety databases that handle high volume, variety and velocity data 
which involves using distributed file systems to manage the scale of the data; safety 
ontologies and visual analytics that function as facilitators for the fusion of data-sources 
and machine-assisted interpretation; and artificial intelligence solutions to extract safety 
information from big data.  
We believe that this paper describes just the tip of the iceberg of opportunities opening up 
for safety analysis that, after all, depends on data. 
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